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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the estimation of horizontal inequity, remaining within the 
framework of the close equals groups approach started by Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert (1994), and systematised by Urban and Lambert (2008). Within the 
framework of the close equals groups the choice of bandwidth, which determines 
the intervals of close equal income units, is fundamental. Following the existing 
literature on the redistributive effect decomposition, we propose a new criterion for 
the identification of the optimal bandwidth: in this article the identification of close 
equals groups is mainly oriented to the estimation of horizontal inequity. Our 
criterion intends to be a contribution to empirical work that focuses on comparing 
the effects of different tax systems on a particular population of taxpayers. In order 
to test the robustness of the new criterion, different tax systems, characterised by 
different degrees of tax progressivity, are applied to Italian and Polish personal 
income tax data. Our results suggest the bandwidths, chosen according to our 
methodology, are more stable than those obtained by maximising potential vertical 
effects. 
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1. Introduction 
As Kakwani and Lambert (1998, p.369) observe “Horizontal equity and 
vertical equity are two of the basic commands of social equity, requiring, 
respectively, the equal treatment of equals and the appropriately unequal 
treatment of unequals”.1 Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994, p.262) have 
already stressed that horizontal equity violations should not be confused 
with vertical equity violations, as the former concept concerns “the 
(unequal) treatment of equals”, and the latter deals with “utility re-ranking”, 
which is “an effect among unequals”. As the authors observe, horizontal 
and vertical equity violations should be considered for given “specifications 
of the utility/income relationship”. 
In their seminal article Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) start from the 
redistributive effect, measured by the difference between pre- and post-tax 
income inequalities. These inequalities are measured by Gini coefficients. 
The authors consider the unequal treatment of equals, i.e. the horizontal 
inequity (HI), and violations of vertical equity, i.e. the re-ranking among 
unequals, as two different effects reducing the potential redistributive (or 
vertical) effect that would be attained if no violation occurred. Under this 
intuition, they decompose the redistribute effect into the sum of three 
indexes that measure the above three specified effects: potential vertical 
effect, horizontal inequity, and re-ranking. 
                                                 
1 For a recent contribution to the debate on the concepts of social justice and equity, starting from Amartya Sen’s 
conception, see Villani (2012). 
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Their original intention was to measure HI by splitting the pre-tax income 
distribution into groups of equals, that is into groups of income units with 
exactly the same income; as a consequence, within these groups the Gini 
coefficient is zero. In the transition from pre- to post-tax income distribution 
they then check if the income units, which had equal pre-tax incomes, 
maintain equal post-tax incomes. If they do not, then HI appears. 
Post-tax within group income inequality can be checked easily by 
calculating within group Gini indexes: if these indexes become different 
from zero, taxes generate HI. 
Consequently, having partitioned the pre-tax income distribution into groups 
of exact equals, after tax re-ranking would only involve income units that 
have different incomes in the pre-tax distribution. 
However, the real data are often characterised by the lack or sparseness of 
units with the same income. As Urban and Lambert (2008) observe, 
empirical works apply the methodology suggested by Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert (1994) in the context of close equals groups (henceforth CEG) - 
groups with “close” pre-tax income. CEG are created by splitting the pre-tax 
income distribution into contiguous intervals with the same bandwidth. In 
this context, HI should be measured by the increase of within group 
inequality. As Urban and Lambert (2008) recall, van de Ven, Creedy and 
Lambert (2001) show that an arbitrary specification of close equals groups 
can lead to misleading results. As a consequence, this approach faces two 
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contrasting needs. First, in order to allow reliable estimations of the HI, the 
bandwidth should be large enough to create groups containing sufficient 
observations. Second, as it is difficult to refer to close equals when the 
bandwidth is large, it should be as small as possible. It should be noted that 
the former requirement conflicts with the latter. 
Two other considerations are relevant in this kind of analysis. When the 
bandwidth grows, re-ranking within groups introduces some confusion into 
what, according to initial intentions, should be an analysis of equals. 
Moreover, when bandwidths are small, post-tax within group Gini indexes 
can be greater than corresponding pre-tax ones; the opposite happens when 
the bandwidths become large. 
van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) suggest that CEG can be optimally 
defined in terms of class width by choosing the bandwidth which maximises 
the potential (vertical) redistributive effect. Urban and Lambert (2008) 
reconsider the previous literature on this topic, and “reconcile a number of 
approaches to measuring equity in tax systems that coexist in the literature 
but appear to offer slightly differing recipes to the practitioner...” (Urban - 
Lambert, 2008, p. 564). 
Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003) deal with the problem of estimating HI by 
non-parametric regressions and simulations. While remaining within the 
CEG framework started by Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), our 
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analysis, aiming directly at the estimation of HI, reconsiders the problem of 
choosing the optimal bandwidth. 
As outlined above, in choosing the proper bandwidth one has to cope with 
two contrasting requirements: i) in order to yield reliable estimations of HI, 
CEG should contain sufficient observations; ii) CEG should capture real 
close equals. 
By looking inside the index, first introduced by Urban and Lambert (2008), 
to measure the potential (vertical) redistributive effect, we can suggest a 
new criterion for the identification of the optimal bandwidth when the main 
target is specifically oriented to the estimation of the HI. Our criterion 
balances group consistency and heterogeneity, and measures them with 
respect to the potential vertical effect. 
We do not want to call into question the suggestion of van de Ven, Creedy 
and Lambert (2001), as their analysis primarily focuses on the estimation of 
the potential vertical effect: our criterion can be theoretically well grounded 
when estimating the horizontal effect. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic 
analytical instruments to face the problem and illustrates Urban and 
Lambert’s (2008) decomposition of the redistributive effect, which is used 
to estimate both the vertical and the horizontal effect. In Section 3 we face 
the issue of choosing the optimal bandwidth, and develop an operational 
criterion of new conception. Investigating the effects of different tax 
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systems on a matching population of income units, Section 4 tests the 
robustness of our criterion, by using the criterion proposed by van de Ven, 
Creedy and Lambert (2001) as a benchmark. Different tax systems 
characterised by different degrees of tax progressivity, as well as by 
different systems of tax credits, are applied to Italian and Polish pre-tax 
income distribution. According to our empirical results, when bandwidths 
are chosen by our methodology they are more stable than those obtained by 
maximising potential redistributive effects. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Urban and Lambert’s decomposition of the redistributive effect 
and the HI measure 
Let Kxxx ,...,, 21  be the pre-tax income levels associated to K income units, 
and yi denote the post-tax income of unit i (i=1, 2,..., K); we assume that all 
incomes have been transformed into equivalent incomes by a proper 
equivalent scale. We indicate the pre-tax and post-tax income distribution 
by X and Y, respectively. Let: XG  and YG  be the Gini coefficients for the 
pre- and the post-tax income parade, and let YD  be the concentration 
coefficient for the post-tax incomes, once they are ordered according to the 
corresponding pre-tax incomes, ranked in a non-decreasing order. 
Urban and Lambert (2008) consider the decomposition of the redistributive 
effect RE: 
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X YRE G G  ,             (1) 
and the Kakwani (1984), vertical effect VK: 
K
X YV G D  .             (2) 
By introducing the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index: 
YY
APK DGR              (3) 
which measures the re-ranking between the pre- and post-tax distribution,2 
RE can be rewritten as: 
K APKRE V R  .            (4) 
Urban and Lambert split the index VK into two indexes, measuring the “full 
vertical effect” and horizontal inequity (HI), respectively. In order to split 
VK, the authors adopt the approach of the close equals group (CEG), which 
are created, as said before, by partitioning the pre-tax income distribution 
into contiguous income classes with the same bandwidth. 
Before introducing Urban and Lambert’s indexes, we need to recall some 
properties and rules concerning the decomposition of Gini and concentration 
indexes, and some preliminary definitions. 
As CEG are contiguous income groups, when considering pre-tax ordering, 
no overlapping exists among groups by construction, as the maximum 
income in group k (k=1, 2,..,K) cannot be greater than the minimum income 
in group k+1. As a consequence, due to the absence of any intersection 
among groups in the pre-tax distribution, the Gini coefficient decomposes 
                                                 
2 Plotnick (1981). 0 2APK YR G  : it is zero when no re-ranking occurs. 
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exactly into the sum of BXG , the between group component, and 
W
XG , the 
within group component: 
B W
X X XG G G  .             (5) 
In (5) the between group component BXG  is obtained by substituting all 
incomes within each group by their group average. The within group 
component is defined as , ,
W
X k X k X
k
G a G , where ,k XG  is the Gini 
coefficient for the k-th group, ,k Xa  is the product of the population share, 
and the income share attributed to the k-th group. 
Taxes can reshuffle the ordering either among income units or among 
income groups; leaving income units in the pre-tax ordering, if we replace 
pre-tax incomes by corresponding post-tax ones then the concentration 
index DY decomposes as: 
B W
Y Y YD D D  .             (6) 
In (6) BYD  is the between group concentration index: maintaining the pre-tax 
group ordering, it corresponds to BXG  when the pre-tax group averages are 
substituted by the corresponding post-tax ones. WYD  is the within group 
concentration index, which is equal to , ,k Y k Y
k
a D , being Dk,Y the 
concentration index within group k, calculated when, within the group, post-
tax incomes are aligned in the pre-tax order. 
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In general, the post-tax Gini index no longer decomposes into only two 
components. As Urban and Lambert explain and illustrate by examples, in 
the post-tax distribution, groups identified from the pre-tax distribution can 
now overlap one another. Having ranked CEG according to their post-tax 
income averages, it is no longer guaranteed that the maximum income of 
group k is no greater than the minimum income of group k+1; when this is 
the case group overlapping (or transvariation) is introduced by taxes. When 
groups overlap, the Gini coefficient decomposes as: 
B W AJL
Y Y YG G G R   .           (7) 
In (7) BYG  and 
W
YG  are defined analogously to the terms 
B
XG  and 
W
XG , which 
appear in (4), mutatis mutandis. In Urban and Lambert’s (2008) notation, 
RAJL is the index that measures group overlapping: RAJL is zero if groups do 
not present any intersection, otherwise it is positive.3 
Keeping in mind (7) and (6), the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index can be 
written as:  
WBAJLAPK RRRR  ,           (8) 
where BR  and WR  are given by:4 
B
Y
B
Y
B DGR  ,             (9) 
W W W
Y YR G D  .             (10) 
                                                 
3 The label AJL is an acronym for Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994). Dagum (1997) calls it GT, being T an 
acronym for transvariation. 
4 0 2B BYR G  : it is zero if no re-ranking occurs among group averages. 0 2W WYR G  : it is zero if no re-
ranking occurs within any group. 
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Urban and Lambert introduce “a counterfactual post-tax income 
distribution, one in which the operation of the tax system within each close 
equals group has been smoothed”. In this distribution, net incomes are 
obtained by applying the average group tax rate to each income within a 
same group. Due to the properties of the Gini coefficient, the within group 
Gini index is calculated as: 
, ,
SW
Y k Y k Xk
G a G             (11) 
Observe that the concentration index for this distribution, when the pre-tax 
ordering is maintained, is given by the sum of the two components BYD  and 
SW
YG . 
Given the definitions introduced above, Urban and Lambert measure the 
potential redistributive (vertical) effect by the following index: 
 UL B SWX Y YV G D G   .          (12) 
In what concerns the horizontal effect, they suggest the index: 
UL W SW
Y YH D G  .            (13) 
As it is easily checked that UL UL KV H V  , Urban and Lambert can 
decompose the equation of the redistributive effect as per formula (14): 
UL UL APKRE V H R   .           (14) 
Defining HAJL as 
AJL W SW
Y YH G G   , , ,k Y k Y k X
k
a G G  ,       (15) 
Urban and Lambert observe that HUL can be obtained from the difference: 
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UL AJL WH H R              (16) 
Whilst RE and RAPK are invariant, the terms VUL, HUL, HAJL and RW depend 
on the bandwidth, so that the choice of a proper bandwidth is crucial for a 
reliable estimation of these terms. Differently from Urban and Lambert, 
who consider the difference of the two terms HAJL and RW, we prefer to keep 
distinct the increase in within group inequality, measured by the former 
index, and the within group re-ranking, expressed by the latter. 
HAJL is a weighted sum of the differences between the post-tax and pre-tax 
Gini index for each group. Urban and Lambert call HAJL a pseudo-horizontal 
effect, and they consider it a proper measure of HI, if no within group re-
ranking occurred. Empirical evidence (Urban - Lambert, 2008; Mussini - 
Zavanella, 2009) shows that, as long as the bandwidth remains relatively 
narrow, HAJL presents an increasing trend. In Mussini and Zavanella’s 
empirical analysis, it starts decreasing for bandwidth larger than 5,000 euro, 
and in Urban and Lambert’s analysis, for bandwidths larger than 15,000 
HRK. In what concerns WYR , it has a trend that is a direct function of the 
bandwidth. It is worth noting the lines that represent the behaviour of these 
components are not regular: they smooth when the bandwidths become 
relatively large. 
According to the suggestion of van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001), the 
bandwidth should be chosen in order to maximise VUL. This procedure has a 
rationale when the main object is the estimation of the VUL. However, in this 
 
 
14 
paper the main issue is the estimation of the two components of HUL, that is 
the pseudo-horizontal effect HAJL, and RW, which measures the extent of 
within group re-ranking. In the next section, by reconsidering in-depth the 
components of VUL, we will introduce a new criterion for the choice of the 
bandwidth. 
 
 
3. A new criterion to face the issue of the “optimal” bandwidth 
Let us consider Urban and Lambert’s potential (vertical) redistributive effect 
VUL as in equation (12), and write it as:  
UL B B VWV RE R P   ,           (17) 
where B B BX YRE G G   and  , , ,VW k Y k X k X
k
P a a G   .5 
As noticed above, when estimating HI, as it is almost impossible to deal 
with a sufficient number of exact equals in order to create reasonable CEG, 
it becomes crucial to state how large the bandwidth should be. The 
bandwidth should be large enough to contain a sufficient number of close 
equal incomes, and small enough to avoid including rather unequal ones. 
Using the approaches of Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) and van de 
Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) as a reference point, let us assume that 
government must form and implement taxation policy subject to 
                                                 
5 VWP is the acronym of vertical within group progressivity; B B BX YRE G G   is van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert’s 
potential redistributive effect ( VCLV  in Urban and Lambert’s notation). 
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imperfection, such that after tax, incomes yi are the sum of net incomes ν(xi), 
deriving from the application of the effective tax schedule, and the outcome 
ui of a random variable U, with zero expected value. It is the random 
variable that generates departures of the actual tax schedule from the 
effective one. If the tax schedule respects Kakwani and Lambert’s (1998) 
axioms for the assumed utility/income relationship, according to which: (i) 
taxes should increase monotonically with respect to people’s ability to pay; 
(ii) richer people should pay taxes at higher rates; (iii) net incomes should 
maintain the same ranking as pre-tax incomes, HI and re-ranking can only 
be generated by the outcomes ui. 
In order to obtain a reliable estimation for HI, a representative number of 
deviations from fair taxation should be considered. We can presume that the 
number of deviations is representative when their average converges to their 
expected value, which is zero. When within groups deviation averages 
 1 g ii gN u  converge to zero, the rank of  1 g ii gN y   ’g converges 
to the rank of    1 g ii gN x   ’g, that is to the rank of  1 g ii gN x   : 
on this basis we can argue that the number of observation in CEG is large 
enough, at least in the most relevant groups, when BR  tends to zero. 
However, we want these deviations to represent, not a generic inequity, but 
HI. We recall from equation (17) that the potential vertical index ULV  
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contains the components BR  and VWP ; the latter depending on the within 
CEG pre-tax inequalities ,k XG  (k=1, 2, …, K), weighed by  , ,k Y k Xa a . 
If considered in terms of absolute value, the weights , ,k Y k Xa a  are a direct 
function of tax progressivity. They can be rewritten as 
   2 2 1k k kn t t n t   , where nk are the income units in group k; μk are 
the average group k pre-tax incomes in group k, tk are the average tax rate in 
group k; t  is the overall tax rate; and n is the total number of income units. 
As a rule, since income distributions are right skewed, VWP  is expected to 
be positive. The positive values  , ,k Y k Xa a  corresponding t >tk, are 
generally greater than the negative ones (corresponding to t <tk), this is 
because the former are associated with groups more crowded than the latter. 
Even if, in the left tail of the distribution, CEG present income averages 
lower than those in the right tail, the frequency effect overcomes the income 
effect. As long as the bandwidth does not become very large, at least for all 
groups that can reasonably contain close equals, empirical evidence 
confirms that VWP  actually shows a trend, which is a direct function of the 
bandwidth, as it is for within CEG pre-tax inequalities ,k XG .6 In any case, 
VWP  is never negative. Moreover, the more progressive the tax, the steeper 
the slope of the VWP  curve in its ascending part. Conversely, empirical 
                                                 
6 Mussini and Zavanella (2009); Mazurek (2012). 
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evidence shows that BR  is an inverse function of the bandwidth, although 
with moderate irregular jumps. 
In order to control for CEG consistency, BR  should be as close to zero as 
possible. On the other side, insofar as VWP  is a measure of the interaction of 
pre-tax within group inequalities and tax progressivity, we can control 
groups that are actually CEG, by keeping it as small as possible. In light of 
the specular behaviour of VWP  and BR , we can determine that the most 
convenient bandwidth tallies with that minimising the greater index between 
VWP  and BR .7 As both indexes can be close to zero, as ULV  also tends to 
zero,8 in order to rule out indeterminate results, we suggest considering the 
ratio of said indexes with respect to the potential vertical effect, that is 
 VW ULP V  and  B ULR V . 
In light of the above argument, we can conveniently adopt the following 
criterion to determine the optimal bandwidth (OB): 
 arg inf
B
OB F B ,             (18) 
where 
 
if ,
otherwise,
VW VW B
UL UL UL
B
UL
P P R
V V VF B
R
V
  
 
                                                 
7 Of course if VWP  increases monotonically whilst BR  decreases monotonically as the bandwidth increases, one 
can simply look for the bandwidth where VW BP R . 
8 Not only BR , but also VWP  tends to zero only for enormously large bandwidths. However, when the latter 
starts decreasing, ULV  also is much lower than KV
 
and tends to zero (Mussini - Zavanella, 2009; Mazurek, 
2012). 
 
 
18 
and the argument B stands for bandwidth. 
Resorting to criterion (18) we can determine the bandwidth, and in turn we 
are able to estimate the two components of ULH , that is to say AJLH  
and WR . Empirical evidence shows that the new criterion exhibits an 
asymmetric U shape: it is quite steep on the left descending side, and 
presents a long, almost stable line to the right. We found that by applying 
criterion (18) both the bandwidths and estimates were more stable than 
those, for example, obtained by maximising the index of the potential 
vertical effect. Thus, our criterion compares favourably with the criterion 
which maximises both ULV  and AJLV =  B SWX Y YG G G  , the latter being one 
of the main indexes discussed by Urban and Lambert for the potential 
vertical effect evaluation.9 
In concluding this section, we remark on the decomposition of the 
Atkinson-Kakwani-Plotnick index, which the reference literature usually 
splits into the between group and within group re-ranking effects, together 
with the overlapping components, that is to say APK AJL B WR R R R   . 
On the basis of Dagum’s (1997) definition of the gross between group 
component, we prefer to decompose RAPK into the two effects RW and RAG. 
As Monti, Mussini and Vernizzi (2010) show, RAG measures the re-ranking 
between income units belonging to different groups, either in the presence 
                                                 
9 We do not consider maximizing VVCL; as it appears in Urban and Lambert (2005; 2008), Mussini and Zavanella 
(2009) and Mazurek (2012). The maximum for VVCL is reached for quite large bandwidths, so that income groups 
can hardly be considered as CEG. For an analysis concerning the whole income range, we refer to Mussini and 
Zavanella (2009) and Mazurek (2012). We observe that VW VCL AJLP V V   and B UL AJLR V V  . 
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or in the absence of group average re-ranking. Conversely, AJLR  cannot be 
always interpreted as a real re-ranking indicator. In fact, when the two units 
i and j belong to different groups, they maintain the same relative rank 
positions both in the pre-tax and post-tax distribution, whilst the relative 
positions of their own groups permutes, they contribute to AJLR  but no re-
ranking occurs for what concerns their pre-tax and post-tax incomes. As the 
authors show, RAG can be calculated directly, or by subtracting RW from 
RAPK.10 
In the next section we test and confirm our criterion by applying several 
different tax systems to a dataset of Italian and Polish income earners. The 
income distributions we chose are very different; we applied a set of diverse 
real or hypothesised tax systems to these distributions. We show that results 
of our criterion are stable, and can be a useful guideline for the choice of 
optimal bandwidth in empirical works. 
 
 
4. Features and effectiveness of the new criterion when comparing 
different tax systems 
As the researchers are interested in analysing the effects of a real world tax 
reform, they must apply the same bandwidth in order to compare indexes 
that are functions of the bandwidth. This is in contrast to the adoption of a 
                                                 
10 The label AG is the acronym of Across Groups. 0 AG APKR R  , the upper bound is reached when RW=0. 
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criterion that tailors the proper bandwidth to each tax system. In fact, if one 
assumes that “true” indexes are calculated in correspondence with the 
optimal bandwidth, indexes calculated in correspondence with other 
bandwidths will provide, at the best, approximations of the former. 
Therefore, a criterion should also take into account the approximation errors 
that arise when a unique bandwidth is adopted for different tax systems. 
To consider different hypothetical tax systems, in this section we compare 
our criterion as per formula (18), with the criterion which maximises the 
vertical effect. Even if our main interest concerns AJLH  and WR , that is to 
say the two components of HUL, we shall also examine the performance of 
our criterion in estimating both ULV  and AJLV .11 In the following, we 
indicate the values taken by (18) by mr, and the maximum values of VUL and 
of VAJL by MUL and MAJL, respectively. 
The comparisons were performed by simulations, based on gross income 
distributions, in both Italy and the municipality of Wrocław (Poland). Both 
the Italian and Polish datasets are considered separately. The gross income 
distribution for Italy was obtained through a micro-simulation model based 
on the 2008 Bank of Italy survey of household income and wealth 
(Pellegrino - Piacenza - Turati, 2011), while that for the municipality of 
Wrocław is based on a 2001 dataset, kindly made available by the Lower-
Silesian tax office. 
                                                 
11 As AG APK AGR R R  , with APKR  invariant with respect to the bandwidth, the considerations reported for WR , 
can be applied also to AGR . 
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The choice of the two datasets is based upon the argument that they exhibit 
different characteristics capable of highlighting the validity of the proposed 
criterion. The Polish pre-tax income distribution presents indexes of greater 
inequality, a stronger right skewness, and a heavier right tail than those of 
the Italian dataset.12 
Applied economists and statisticians may then be interested in decomposing 
the redistributive effect by using both taxpayers’ nominal income, or 
equivalent households’ income. Here we show results concerning only 
nominal incomes. We also applied the same methodology to corresponding 
equivalent distributions, and find that results are not affected when the 
adopted equivalence scale varies. 
A set of different hypothetical tax systems (see appendix for details) was 
applied to gross incomes: ten for the Italian income distribution and sixteen 
for the Polish one. The tax systems we chose for both countries varied from 
a very progressive system (21 brackets and tax rates ranging from 3 per cent 
to 85 per cent in the case of Italy; a system close to the Italian one in the 
1970s), to a substantially flat system (in which tax progressivity depends 
only on tax credits and allowances for items of expenditures). The set of tax 
structures applied to the Polish gross incomes was constructed by taking 
into account tax systems actually applied or widely discussed in Poland, 
                                                 
12 The summary statistics for the Italian gross income distribution are: mean income = 19,087 euro; standard 
deviation = 22,148; Skewness = 10.88; Kurtosis = 267.47. The summary statistics for  the Polish gross income 
distribution are: mean income = 7,786 PLN; standard deviation = 23,180 PLN; Skewness = 24.23; Kurtosis = 
825.31. 
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from the simplest flat tax system, to a more progressive tax system with four 
income brackets. In order to implement the “iniquity”, net incomes have 
been “disturbed” by different types of random errors. We could then 
generate a set of tax systems with RE ranging from 0.004% to 6.339 %. It 
should be noted that the set of tax systems we adopted are considered to 
have the likely characteristics of personal income tax structures applied 
worldwide, either presently or historically. As our chosen criterion proved 
to be very stable, both along different shapes of the income distribution, and 
along very different tax systems, it can be very useful in empirical 
applications. 
For each criterion, mr, MUL and MAJL, we obtain a set of N bandwidths, 
1 2, ,.., ,..,
mr mr mr mr
i Nb b b b   , 1 2, ,.., ,..,MUL MUL MUL MULi Nb b b b   , and 
1 2, ,.., ,..,
MAJL MAJL MAJL MAJL
i Nb b b b   , each bandwidth being “optimal” for one of 
the N tax systems. Table 1 and Table 2 report the series of optimal 
bandwidths, and the corresponding “optimal” parameter values for AJLH , 
WR  and ULV , for each criterion and each tax system. 
Looking at our simulations, we see that the bandwidth range for the mr 
criterion is much narrower than those for the MUL and MAJL criteria. 
Consider for example the case of Italy (Table 1). Optimal bandwidth varies 
from 210 of system 6 to 460 of system 10 with mr criterion: the range of 
variation is 250. On the contrary, both MAJL and UL criteria show a greater 
range of variation and, most importantly, strong differences between them: 
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the optimal bandwidth varies from 100 of system 1 (the very progressive 
system) to 2,060 of system 2 (the flat system) for MUL criterion: the range 
of variation is 1,960. Also for MAJL criterion the range is larger than that of 
mr criterion: the optimal bandwidth varies from 290 of system 5 to 1,060 of 
system 2. 
Similar results are found when simulations on the Polish distribution are 
considered. Table 2 shows that optimal bandwidth varies from 100 of 
system 7 to 320 of system 9 for mr criterion: the range of variation is only 
220. On the contrary, both MUL and MAJL criteria show a greater range of 
variation: the optimal bandwidth varies from 20 of system 1 and 3 to 3,000 
of system 12, and from 120 of system 3 to 3,000 of system 12, respectively. 
Focusing on AJLH , let us indicate by  |AJL MULsH b s ,  |AJL MAJLsH b s  and 
 |AJL mrsH b s  the value assumed by AJLH  in correspondence with the 
bandwidths, which are optimal (for the tax system s) according to the 
criteria MUL, MAJL and mr, respectively, give as “optimal” for tax-system 
s. Mutatis mutandis, the same notation is adopted to deal with WR  and ULV , 
in correspondence with the said bandwidths. 
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Table 1: Italian hypothetical tax systems – GX = 43.165 
 
System RE RAPK 
Optimal bandwidth and indexes 
mr criterion MUL criterion MAJL criterion 
Bandwidth HAJL RW  VUL Bandwidth HAJL RW  VUL Bandwidth HAJL RW VUL 
1 5.25849 0.01404 270 0.00410 0.00409 5.27255 100 0.00188 0.00183 5.27258 780 0.00770 0.00771 5.27253 
2 0.17200 0.02033 230 0.00498 0.00507 0.19226 2060 0.01704 0.01549 0.19389 2060 0.01704 0.01549 0.19389 
3 3.90218 0.01721 250 0.00429 0.00441 3.91927 780 0.00925 0.00897 3.91966 780 0.00925 0.00897 3.91966 
4 2.39775 0.03318 240 0.00659 0.00662 2.43089 220 0.00623 0.00613 2.43101 410 0.00988 0.00984 2.43097 
5 5.05238 0.01265 240 0.00310 0.00314 5.06499 100 0.00154 0.00151 5.06506 290 0.00356 0.00359 5.06500 
6 1.11956 0.02008 210 0.00447 0.00453 1.13957 780 0.01091 0.01062 1.13995 780 0.01091 0.01062 1.13995 
7 3.93367 0.02461 240 0.00555 0.00555 3.95828 410 0.00821 0.00813 3.95837 410 0.00821 0.00813 3.95837 
8 4.66382 0.01587 240 0.00387 0.00389 4.67967 100 0.00192 0.00188 4.67973 410 0.00561 0.00561 4.67968 
9 4.76434 0.02408 220 0.00500 0.00499 4.78844 100 0.00258 0.00252 4.78847 410 0.00775 0.00780 4.78836 
10 1.06943 0.43498 460 0.05091 0.05133 1.50398 780 0.08043 0.07774 1.50706 780 0.08043 0.07774 1.50706 
Note: Bandwidth are expressed in euro; indexes have been multiplied by 100.         
Source: Own elaborations.         
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Table 2: Polish hypothetical tax systems – GX = 55.928 
 
System RE RAPK 
Optimal bandwidth and indexes 
mr criterion MUL criterion MAJL criterion 
Bandwidth HAJL RW  VUL Bandwidth HAJL RW  VUL Bandwidth HAJL RW VUL 
1 6.33944 0.00608 280 0.00162 0.00175 6.34539 20 0.00018 0.00018 6.34552 280 0.00162 0.00175 6.34539 
2 2.68961 0.01204 300 0.00363 0.00367 2.70160 120 0.00173 0.00172 2.70166 360 0.00413 0.00418 2.70159 
3 2.87110 0.00098 120 0.00038 0.00039 2.87207 20 0.00009 0.00009 2.87208 120 0.00038 0.00039 2.87207 
4 2.94569 0.00935 280 0.00293 0.00300 2.95498 80 0.00105 0.00105 2.95505 300 0.00307 0.00315 2.95496 
5 2.49566 0.01111 260 0.00311 0.00318 2.50670 180 0.00234 0.00233 2.50678 360 0.00394 0.00396 2.50675 
6 1.91359 0.01005 260 0.00294 0.00302 1.92356 20 0.00031 0.00031 1.92365 320 0.00343 0.00345 1.92363 
7 2.87110 0.00098 100 0.00034 0.00035 2.87207 20 0.00009 0.00009 2.87208 120 0.00038 0.00039 2.87207 
8 2.47797 0.00780 220 0.00224 0.00227 2.48574 60 0.00075 0.00075 2.48577 220 0.00224 0.00227 2.48574 
9 0.00411 0.01025 320 0.00378 0.00381 0.01433 740 0.00622 0.00618 0.01440 740 0.00622 0.00618 0.01440 
10 0.23054 0.00957 280 0.00333 0.00333 0.24010 980 0.00675 0.00661 0.24024 980 0.00675 0.00661 0.24024 
11 0.17795 0.00102 220 0.00057 0.00059 0.17896 600 0.00078 0.00076 0.17899 600 0.00078 0.00076 0.17899 
12 0.27561 0.00742 260 0.00268 0.00268 0.28303 3000 0.00700 0.00666 0.28337 3000 0.00700 0.00666 0.28337 
13 6.33944 0.00608 280 0.00162 0.00175 6.34539 20 0.00018 0.00018 6.34552 360 0.00190 0.00202 6.34540 
14 1.91359 0.01005 280 0.00312 0.00317 1.92360 20 0.00031 0.00031 1.92365 280 0.00312 0.00317 1.92360 
15 5.34034 0.00065 120 0.00018 0.00020 5.34098 20 0.00005 0.00005 5.34100 280 0.00024 0.00034 5.34090 
16 4.37707 0.00418 240 0.00116 0.00122 4.38119 20 0.00015 0.00015 4.38125 340 0.00143 0.00152 4.38116 
Note: Bandwidth are expressed in PLN; indexes have been multiplied by 100.         
Source: Own elaborations.         
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We consider each of the three criteria separately, and assume that, when considering the 
tax system s, the “true” values for AJLH  are meant to be  |AJL MULsH b s ,  |AJL MAJLsH b s  
and  |AJL mrsH b s , each evaluated at the bandwidths MULsb , MAJLsb and mrsb , respectively, 
which are “optimal” for the tax system s. For each criterion, we also calculate the 
quantities  |AJL MULiH b s ,  |AJL MAJLiH b s  and  |AJL mriH b s  in correspondence to the 
other  1N   bandwidths (i=1, 2,..., N, i≠s), reported in Table 1 for Italy and in Table 2 
for Poland. The resulting three sets of  1N   values act as approximations of the three 
“true” values, in the sense specified above. 
The proper efficiency of criteria MUL, MAJL and mr can then be evaluated by the root 
mean square error of the approximations with respect to the corresponding “true” value. 
The corresponding statistics we are interested in are therefore given by: 
     
     
     
2
1
2
1
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
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  (19) 
The quantities  |MUL AJLRMS H s ,  |MAJL AJLRMS H s  and  |mr AJLRMS H s  can be 
calculated for each tax system s. 
The relative efficiency of the mr criterion, with respect to MUL and MAJL, can be 
conveniently defined in terms of ratios: 
   
   
| | ,
| | .
MUL MUL AJL mr AJL
mr
MAJL MAJL AJL mr AJL
mr
e RMS H s RMS H s
e RMS H s RMS H s
   
   
      (20) 
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According to expression (20), mr is more efficient than MUL whenever MULmre  is greater 
than 1. Likewise mr is more efficient than MAJL whenever MAJLmre  is greater than 1. As 
far as WR  (or AGR ) and ULV  are concerned, we can operate in the same way and adopt, 
mutatis mutandis, the same notation. 
Tables 3 and 4 provide the main outcomes of the computations about the MULmre ’s and 
MAJL
mre ’s, for the indexes 
AJLH , WR  and ULV . 
As we can see from Tables 3 and 4, all the MULmre ’s and 
MAJL
mre ’s are greater than 1 and, in 
most cases, even greater than 2. This means that the approximations given by the mr, 
criterion, as per formula (18), are much closer to “true” value than those obtained by the 
maximisation both of VUL and of VAJL. 
In light of the foregoing results, with the support of an empirical evidence argument, we 
can draw the conclusion that the criterion proposed in this paper compares favourably 
with the one proposed by van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001). Our criterion can be 
considered an improvement in choosing a bandwidth that has to be robust with respect 
to changes in post-tax income distributions, as is the case when comparing a sequence 
of tax reforms concerning a population of similar taxpayers. 
 
Table 3: Efficiency of mr criterion in the Italian simulated tax systems 
 HAJL RW VUL 
 MULmre  MAJLmre  MULmre  MAJLmre  MULmre  MAJLmre  
Max 10.30 7.32 9.47 6.56 14.97 14.82 
min 2.55 1.76 2.47 1.73 3.33 2.45 
geometric mean 5.27 2.91 5.47 3.33 9.47 8.97 
n. of cases>2 10 9 10 9 10 10 
n. of cases 1÷2 0 1 0 1 0 0 
n. of cases 0.5÷1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n. of cases  0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Table 4: Efficiency of mr criterion in the Polish simulated tax systems 
 HAJL RW VUL 
 MULmre  MAJLmre  MULmre  MAJLmre  MULmre  MAJLmre  
Max 54.81 55.88 8.98 5.92 90.07 89.56 
min 2.31 1.50 1.66 1.03 1.96 2.66 
geometric mean 5.73 4.19 4.02 2.38 29.94 31.08 
n. of cases>2 16 11 15 12 15 16 
n. of cases 1÷2 0 5 1 4 1 0 
n. of cases 0.5÷1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n. of cases  0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Following an approach which plunges its roots into the seminal contribution of 
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), in this article we consider the problem of 
estimating the HI effect, which can be introduced by a tax system. In principle, HI is the 
unequal treatment of equals. Due to the sparseness of exact equals, in the mainstream 
literature, systematised by Urban and Lambert (2008), exact equals are approximated by 
close equals. Groups of close equals are created by fractioning the pre-tax distribution 
into intervals with the same bandwidth. The identification of bandwidth is then crucial: 
van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) suggest choosing a bandwidth that maximises 
the potential (vertical) effect. The issue which this paper addresses is how to identify an 
approach that explicitly balances two conflicting requirements: group consistency and 
with group heterogeneity. By inspecting the components of the index which Urban and 
Lambert adopt to measure the potential (vertical) effect, we conclude that the two 
above-mentioned requirements can be balanced by observing the well-known group re-
ranking effect RB, and another component we identify as the vertical within effect. 
Beginning with these two components we propose a new criterion for the identification 
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of the bandwidth. This is the contribution of the paper, which goes beyond the 
mainstream literature based on the so-called CEG approach. 
The criterion we propose can be adopted in empirical works focused on comparing the 
effects of different tax systems on a population of taxpayers. According to the 
simulations reported in Section 4, the bandwidths based on the new criterion present 
lower approximation errors than bandwidths based on maximising the potential vertical 
effect. 
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APPENDIX 
Two different approaches were adopted to obtain different unequal treatments of equals 
and re-ranking. The ten tax structures applied to the Italian case consider rate schedules, 
and the actual tax allowances and tax credits for items of expenditure, as well as 
income-related tax credits. On the other hand, the simulations performed on the Polish 
dataset are based on four basic tax systems applied to real gross incomes, each disturbed 
by adding a random term, so that sixteen different tax structures were considered. 
 
The tax structures hypothesised for Italy are as follows: 
SYSTEM 1. A very progressive system with 21 brackets and tax rates ranging from 3 
per cent to 85 per cent. Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of expenditure are 
allowed. 
SYSTEM 2. A 20 per cent flat tax rate: only tax allowances and tax credits for items of 
expenditure are allowed. 
SYSTEM 3. A system with three brackets and three tax rates (10, 30 and 50 per cent): 
only tax allowances and tax credits for items of expenditure are allowed. 
SYSTEM 4. A 30 per cent tax rate. In addition to tax allowances and tax credits for 
items of expenditure, an income related tax credit of 1,000 euro is added. It linearly 
decreases with income, and becomes zero above 100,000 euro. 
SYSTEM 5. A system equal to system 3 with an income related tax credit as in system 
4. 
SYSTEM 6. A system equal to system 2 with an income related tax credit of 500 euro. 
It is linearly decreasing with income, and becomes zero above 50,000 euro. 
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SYSTEM 7. A progressive system with 9 brackets and tax rates ranging from 10 per 
cent to 75 per cent. Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of expenditure are 
allowed. 
SYSTEM 8. A system equal to system 3 with an income related tax credit as in system 
6. 
SYSTEM 9. A system equal to system 7 with an income related tax credit as in system 
6. 
SYSTEM 10. A 70 per cent tax rate. Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of 
expenditure are allowed. 
 
The basic tax structures hypothesised for Poland are as follows: 
BASIC SYSTEM 1. One 15 per cent tax rate is applied to all incomes. All taxpayers 
benefit from 556.02 PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 2. A system with three income brackets: i) 19 per cent from 0 to 
44,490 PLN, ii) 30 per cent from 44,490 to 85,528 PLN, iii) 40 per cent over 85,528 
PLN. All taxpayers benefit from 586.85 PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 3. A system with two income brackets: i) 18 per cent from 0 to 
85,528 PLN, ii) 32 per cent over 85,528 PLN. All taxpayers benefit from 556.02 PLN 
tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 4. A system with four income brackets: i) 10 per cent from 0 to 
20,000 PLN, ii) 20 per cent from 20,000 to 40,000 PLN, iii) 30 per cent from 40,000 to 
90,000 PLN, iv) 40 per cent over 90,000 PLN. All taxpayers benefit from 500.00 PLN 
tax credit. 
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For each tax payer, the tax  iT x  that results after the application of a basic tax system 
is then modified by a random factor, so that net income becomes 
   i i i i iy x T x z T x    ; the factor zi is drawn: 
(a) from the uniform distributions: 
(a1)  ~ 0.2 0.2Z U   , (a2)  ~ 0 0.4Z U  ; 
(b) from the normal distributions: 
(b1) )0133.0 ; 0(~ NZ , (b2) )12.0 ; 0(~ NZ ; 
so that each basic system generates four sub-systems. When the normal distribution is 
applied, the random factor zi is considered in absolute value; the programme did not 
allow incomes to become either negative or greater that 2xi. 
